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*I.C.C.L.R. 87 Introduction
Incorrect ratings of structured products contributed to the collapse of the subprime mortgage market
in the US, which eventually led to the 2008 global financial crisis.1 Investors are currently trying to
hold credit rating agencies (CRAs) liable for their role in the crisis. However, imposing liability upon
CRAs has not been straightforward for a long time. CRAs, for example, argue that ratings are only
predictive opinions and thus protected speech under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the
US. Furthermore, CRAs often invoke disclaimers accompanying their ratings to refute any liability
towards investors.
Following the 2008 financial crisis, several changes have occurred in financial legislation and case
law dealing with the liability of CRAs. This article sheds light on some of these changes. For instance,
courts do not any longer accept that CRAs can always invoke the "traditional defences" to dismiss
liability claims (in the third part of the article). The EU and the US have also adopted legislation which
introduces a private cause of action against CRAs (fourth part). The article subsequently takes a
comparative approach and briefly examines some issues often at stake in cases dealing with the
liability of CRAs. More specifically, it seems that CRAs will only incur liability towards a select class of
(qualified) investors who reasonably or justifiably relied on the rating (fifth part). Prior to that analysis,
the role of CRAs is briefly discussed (second part).2
The role of CRAs as financial intermediaries in capital markets
CRAs evaluate the creditworthiness of financial instruments or the issuers of such instruments.3 They
examine the risk that the payment of interests and capital will not or not completely take place at the
promised time.4 CRAs thus predict the ability of an entity to meet its financial obligations with regard
to the financial instruments it issues.5 CRAs such as Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s or Fitch issue
ratings in the form of a letter or alphabetic symbol. The higher the given rating, the lower the credit
risk for investors. The highest rating on long-term debt securities is generally AAA (triple A), followed
by ratings descending to BBB or below (junk rating).6
By rating financial instruments, CRAs help to reduce informational asymmetries between lenders and
investors on one side and borrowers or issuers on the other side.7 Investors, who in most cases do
not have the capacity or time to examine and evaluate the quality of financial instruments or the
creditworthiness of the issuer of such instruments, use the ratings issued by the CRAs to make
investment decisions. *I.C.C.L.R. 88 8
The use of traditional defences against the liability of CRAs
First Amendment protection for rating "opinions"
Rating reports generally stipulate that ratings are no absolute assurances of credit quality or exact
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measures of the probability that an issuer or financial products will default. Ratings are
forward-looking and predictive opinions about the ability and willingness of an issuer to meet his
financial obligations. Ratings do not recommend purchasing or selling securities.9 Therefore, CRAs
consider themselves as members of the financial press and ratings as opinions, which do not contain
any provably false facts. According to them, ratings are the "world’s shortest editorials" ever written on
the creditworthiness of a company.10 As a consequence, CRAs often argue that they should be given
full First Amendment protection.11
Courts do not, however, always qualify ratings as non-actionable opinions fully protected by the First
Amendment.12 First Amendment protection is not absolute or unconditional only because a rating is
labelled "opinion". Ratings can imply an assertion of an objective fact that may be false or that can be
coupled with false factual assertions.13 The court in California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(CalPERS) v Moody’s Corp, for example, agreed with the plaintiffs that ratings are not mere
predictions of the future value of structured investment vehicles (SIVs). Rather, they are affirmative
representations14 regarding the present state of the SIVs’ financial health and capacity to provide
payments to investors as promised.15
If the falsity of the rating can be demonstrated, CRAs often claim that their ratings are protected by
the actual malice standard under the First Amendment.16 The actual malice standard implies that
CRAs are only liable if the plaintiff (e.g. issuer or investor) is a public figure and the rating a matter of
public concern issued "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not".17
A rating is a matter of public concern the moment CRAs make it available to the benefit of the public
at large18; in other words, when it is distributed "to the world" (internal quotation marks omitted).19 A
rating is thus protected under the actual malice standard if it involves a strong interest in the free flow
of commercial information.20 Ratings are on the other hand a matter of private concern and not
protected by the actual malice standard if they are issued "solely in the individual interest of the
speaker and its specific business audience".21 This is the case when credit ratings are privately
contracted between the CRA and a "select group of qualified investors" or intended for use in private
placement *I.C.C.L.R. 89 offerings to only a very limited number of persons, rather than for
publication in the interest of the general investing public.22
Two other factors also shape the boundaries of the First Amendment protection given to ratings,
namely the involvement of CRAs in structuring securities and the extent to which they have been paid
by the issuer to rate the securities.23 In In re Fitch,24 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld a lower court decision,25 according to which the dissemination of the rating was not based on a
CRA’s judgment about newsworthiness but on the needs of its client. The court considered that it was
the issuer and not the subscribers who had to pay for the rating. Moreover, Fitch was actively
involved in structuring the securities and planning the transaction. Such communication revealed a
level of involvement by the CRA in the transactions of its client that is not typical for the relationship
between a journalist and the activities upon which the latter reports.26
Ratings of structured finance leading to the financial crisis are and will thus be protected by the First
Amendment if they have been made available to the benefit of the general public, if CRAs have not
been involved in creating the securities which they subsequently rate and if they have not received
rating fees "contingent upon the receipt of desired ratings [for such securities] and only in the event
that the transaction closed with those ratings".27
The Bathurst case—lack of reasonable grounds to issue the rating
The question whether a rating is an opinion or (actionable) advice was also at stake in the Australian
Bathurst case.28 The court held that a rating is an opinion on the creditworthiness of a financial
product. It is issued by a professional entity which claims and represents itself as having expertise in
assessing the creditworthiness of financial products. It is neither a guarantee, nor a statement of fact
or advice whether or not to invest.29 This does, however, not mean that CRAs can always invoke the
"mere opinion-argument". Rather, the Bathurst decision underlined that CRAs knew that the intended
recipients of the rating, namely the investors to whom the securities were sold, would rely on it when
making decisions. The rating conveyed an "extremely strong" representation that S&P believed that
the securities were capable to meet their financial commitments.30 Moreover, the assignment of the
highest rating carried with it a "representation that S&P has a genuine and reasonable basis, formed
following the application of its expertise, for reaching the conclusions that it reached".31 As such, a
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rating, whether or not qualified as opinion, will be actionable if it is not based on reasonable grounds
and the result of a CRA’s lack of reasonable care and skill.
Disclaimers in rating agreements and reports
Besides relying on the First Amendment, CRAs often invoke disclaimers in rating reports or
agreements to refute liability towards deceived investors. However, a comparative analysis of case
law shows that disclaimers excluding the liability of CRAs are not always opposable towards investors
or per se valid only because CRAs claim they are.
The Abu Dhabi court held that ratings were actionable opinions. The plaintiffs sufficiently pled that the
CRAs did not genuinely or reasonably believe that the ratings were accurate and had a basis in fact.
Disclaimers stipulating that a "rating represents a [CRA’s] opinion regarding credit quality and is not a
guarantee of performance or a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any securities" are therefore
"unavailing and insufficient to protect [CRAs] from liability for promulgating *I.C.C.L.R. 90 misleading
ratings" (internal quotation marks omitted).32 The CalPERS court held that the investor could recover
his losses unless his conduct, in the light of his own information and intelligence, was "preposterous
and irrational". The effectiveness of disclaimers has to be assessed in light of these principles as well.
The court held that the mere presence of broad disclaimers in rating reports does not necessarily
render an investment decision preposterous or irrational.33 This has to be determined by taking into
account the conduct of the investor and especially whether he justifiably relied on the rating.
The Australian Bathurst court also rejected the reliance by S&P on disclaimers to refute liability.
Disclaimers stipulating that investors should not use ratings when making investment decisions are
inconsistent with the very purpose why CRAs are paid to provide ratings. The model for rating
structured products depends on investors who expect issuers to obtain a rating. The court held that
investors use ratings because they believe, and CRAs are aware thereof as their business model
depends on such belief, that a rating represents "the best independent evidence available about the
risk of loss on the investment".34 Disclaimers can be used to ensure that investors understand that
CRAs do not give advice on the purchase of securities. That is because CRAs are often not aware of
the particular circumstances why the purchaser wants to buy securities. Disclaimers should, however,
not be interpreted as clauses excluding any exercise of care and skill when CRAs issue ratings. That
would make ratings "futile and selfdefeating".35 Moreover, if CRAs want to exclude their liability, they
should at least display the disclaimer in a prominent and visible way. They must make sure that the
disclaimer is sufficiently ("far more prominent[ly]"36) brought to the attention of investors.37
Regulatory reforms on the liability of CRAs after the financial crisis
Regulatory reforms in the EU and the liability of CRAs
Besides changes in case law, the financial crisis also triggered regulatory changes, both in the US
and the EU. Regulation 1060/2009 on CRAs was adopted by the European Parliament and the
Council on 16 September 2009.38 The Regulation has been amended on several occasions and
especially art.35(a), inserted in 2013, is of particular interest as it deals with the liability of CRAs.39
CRAs can only be held liable when they commit intentionally or with gross negligence any of the
infringements listed in Annex III to the Regulation.40 CRAs will thus not incur liability for simple
negligence or merely because they have issued an incorrect rating.41 The infringement of the
Regulation must also have (had) an impact on the rating.42 Furthermore, the investor has to establish
that he reasonably relied on the rating either in accordance with art.5(a)(1) of the Regulation, or
otherwise with due care for a decision to invest into, hold on to or divest from a financial instrument
covered by the rating.43
If all these requirements are met, investors may claim compensation from the CRA for the loss they
have incurred.44 Several problems, however, remain with regard to the application of the Regulation.
In addition to the high threshold of proof for investors, the Regulation refers to national law for the
interpretation and application of essential concepts such as "reasonably relied", "gross negligence" or
"due care". Moreover, matters concerning the liability of CRAs which are not covered by the
Regulation, including causation and liability for ordinary negligence, are governed by national law.
*I.C.C.L.R. 91 45
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Regulatory reforms in the US and the liability of CRAs
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) was passed by
the US Congress in July 2010.46 Prior to the changes introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act, r.436(g) of
the Securities Act stipulated that credit ratings from a nationally registered statistical rating
organisation (NRSRO)47 assigned to public offerings were not considered as an expert-certified part
of the registration statement. Contrary to auditors, CRAs could thus not be held liable if the
registration statement contained an incorrect rating.48
The Dodd-Frank Act repealed r.436(g) of the Securities Act. As a consequence, the issuer has to
seek the written consent of an NRSRO before including a rating in the registration statement. The
NRSRO giving its consent can thus incur liability as expert for the material misstatements or
omissions concerning the credit rating which is included in the registration statement.49 However,
considering the threat of potential liability, NRSROs refused to give their consent. This led to the
freezing and the collapse of the asset-backed securitisation market because issuers were no longer
able to offer securities.50 The US Committee on Financial Services, therefore, approved the removal
of expert liability for CRAs ("no-action relief") in July 2011.51
Section 933(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act lessened the pleading requirements in private actions for
securities fraud under s.10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193452 and the thereunder
adopted SEC r.10b-5.53 Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, a plaintiff had to plead with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that CRAs misrepresented or omitted to disclose
material information with scienter.54 Scienter has been defined as a "mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud".55 Following the changes introduced by s.933(b), plaintiffs must now
only establish particular facts giving rise to a strong inference that a CRA knowingly or recklessly
failed to (1) conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security with respect to the factual
elements relied upon by its methodology for evaluating the credit risk; or (2) obtain reasonable
verification that such an investigation was done by a source independent of the issuer or underwriter.
*I.C.C.L.R. 92 56
Tendencies in case law after the 2008 financial crisis
Brief overview of the grounds of liability in the US
Investors have filed claims against CRAs on different grounds in the US. These grounds include
securities and common law fraud,57 negligent misrepresentation58 and third-party beneficiary
protection for CRAs under the rating contract.59 Although an indepth discussion of these grounds
does not fall within the scope of this article, the following paragraphs shed light on two elements often
at stake in cases of negligent misrepresentation and (common law) fraud.
First, claims for negligent misrepresentation in certain US states require a "privity-like special
relationship" (internal quotation marks omitted) between the CRA and investors.60 The Southern
District of New York in King County, for example, held that the relationship was privity-like because
the CRAs (1) intended that the rating would be used by the plaintiffs to evaluate the SIV; (2) intended
that the plaintiffs, who were members of a select group of qualified investors, would rely on the rating
to evaluate the SIV; and (3) prepared the rating with the "end and aim" to induce investors to invest in
the SIV (because the rating was designed to meet their needs).61 In this regard, claims for negligent
misrepresentation have already been dismissed because there was no direct contact or
communication between the investors and the CRA establishing a (special) relationship which
approaches privity.62 In other states, plaintiffs have to show that the rating was supplied with the intent
to influence the investors or a particular class of investors to which they belong in a specific
transaction, without explicitly requiring a special or privity-like relationship.63
A common feature in claims of negligent misrepresentation against CRAs seems that the investor
who uses the rating has to be part of a limited class or select group of (qualified) investors whose
reliance on the rating was foreseeable to the CRA.64 Actual knowledge of the identity of each
particular investor is, however, not necessary as long as the rating is created to target a select group
of qualified investors instead of the "faceless"65 investing public at large.66 Investors are not part of a
limited class if the allegations suggest both a widespread availability of the securities and a
widespread reliance on the ratings (e.g. because the securities were not offered through private
placement to only a certain type of investor).67
Page4
Secondly, claims for negligent misrepresentation or common law fraud can be dismissed if investors
did not justifiably or reasonably rely on the credit rating. The Abu Dhabi court concluded that the
plaintiffs reasonably relied on the ratings because the market at large, including sophisticated
investors, has come to rely on ratings issued by independent CRAs given "their NRSRO status and
access to non-public information that even sophisticated investors cannot obtain".68 Similarly, the
CalPERS court held that, contrary to the corporate market, investors in *I.C.C.L.R. 93 the structured
finance market cannot reasonably develop their own informed opinions because there is insufficient
public information to do so. Reliance on credit ratings is thus justified if (sophisticated) investors are
unable to conduct an own analysis or develop their independent views about potential investments.69
The Bathurst decision and the duty of care for CRAs
In the Australian Bathurst case, 23 New South Wales Regional Councils suffered financial losses
after the purchase of CPDO (constant proportion debt obligations) notes. The structured products
were marketed by Local Government Financial Services (LGFS), created by ABN Amro Bank and
given a "triple A" rating by S&P. The full Federal Court of Australia upheld the first instance decision
which ruled that the rating contained false and misleading statements violating s.1041E of the
Corporations Act. The assignment of the rating by S&P was also qualified as misleading and
deceptive conduct under s.1041H of the Australian Corporations Act and s.12DA of the Securities and
Investments Commission Act.70 The rating was misleading and deceptive because it conveyed a
representation that, according to S&P, the capacity of the structured products to meet their financial
obligations was "extremely strong".71
More importantly, the Bathurst decision ruled that S&P had a duty to exercise reasonable care and
skill in forming its opinion. CRAs must have reasonable grounds to issue the credit rating.72 The court
held that S&P owed such a duty of reasonable care and skill towards "vulnerable" and
"unsophisticated" investors with whom the CRA does not have a contract.73 Investors are vulnerable if
they are unable to assess the creditworthiness of the financial products or to "second-guess" the
rating. This can occur if the only available information on the creditworthiness of the (issuer of the)
securities is the rating.74
The question was thus not whether S&P had to give another, more correct and appropriate rating.75
Rather, the court concluded that S&P violated its duty of care because the CRA did not have
reasonable grounds to assign the rating. The rating was not the result of reasonable care and skill.76
S&P did not develop its own model for rating CPDOs but instead relied on the model created by ABN
Amro. The CRA did also not give any consideration to the model risk when assigning the credit rating.
77 S&P adopted a 15% volatility figure which had been provided to it by ABN Amro. There was no
evidence that S&P checked the 15% volatility figure itself. However, S&P could have easily calculated
the volatility and would then have realised that the correct figure was around 28%. A reasonable and
prudent CRA would have done its own calculations and surely not have adopted a volatility figure of
15%.78 Against this background, the court held that the analysis of S&P did not comprise mere
mistakes or errors of judgment. Rather, it
"involve[s] failures of such a character that no reasonable ratings agency exercising reasonable care
and skill could have committed in the rating of the CPDOs".
In sum, the "[rating] analysis was fundamentally flawed, unreasonable and irrational in numerous
respects".79
The first instance court also held that it was reasonable for investors to rely on the rating. A rating is
an opinion given by an expert in the field of structured finance who is assumed to exercise reasonable
care and skill.80 S&P claimed that imposing a duty of care would lead to potential liability to an
indeterminate number of purchasers. Justice Jagot, however, found this argument unpersuasive. The
class of persons to whom S&P owed *I.C.C.L.R. 94 a duty of care was ascertainable. More
specifically, the class comprised of potential purchasers of the minimum $500,000 subscription in the
$40 million issue of the notes. S&P also controlled several factors confining the scope of potential
liability (e.g. the amount of issued products to which the rating relates, the conditions to impose on the
communication of any rating and the ability to reduce or control its liability by downgrading or
withdrawing the rating).81 On appeal, it was also decided that the liability was not indeterminate
because S&P knew that the investors were members of a class, the essential characteristic of which
was that each investor wanted to purchase the notes. For a duty of care to exist, CRAs are thus not
required to know the precise identity of the recipient of the rating. S&P also knew the foreseeable type
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of loss as it is the nature of the loss (e.g. losing "the money [investors] had invested in the notes") and
not the precise amount that has to be taken into account.82 In other words, both the class of investors
and the foreseeable loss were determined by the function that S&P undertook, which was "delineated
by the purpose of the rating … and the known reasonable reliance".83
Finally, S&P alleged that it could not owe a duty of care because there were no direct dealings
between or any contractual relationship with each investor. The decision on appeal, however, rejected
this argument. The court ruled that S&P knew that the issuer obtained and paid for the rating only to
communicate it to the "interested parties" so that they could use it in deciding whether or not to invest.
A contractual nexus between the CRA and the investors was in such circumstances not required.84
Concluding remarks
Investors have filed claims against CRAs on several grounds following the financial crisis. Based on
the analysis of (recent) case law, it can at least be said that CRAs are no longer able to always
successfully hide behind the traditional defences. There are currently pending cases against CRAs in
the US85 and in several EU Member States.86 It remains thus to be seen how the liability of CRAs will
evolve in the future.
Especially the question whether the acceptance of the duty of care in the Bathurst decision will have
consequences in other jurisdictions is uncertain. English courts are, for example, reluctant to
recognise that other "certifiers" such as auditors87 and classification societies88 have a duty of care
towards third parties. Nonetheless, it remains unlikely that CRAs will incur liability in an "indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class" if a duty of care were to be accepted in
other jurisdictions.89 Following recent decisions in the US and especially the Australian Bathurst,
CRAs will only be liable to a select class of (qualified) investors whose reliance on the rating was
foreseeable or known to the CRA.90 Moreover, investors need to establish that they reasonably or
justifiably relied on the rating. This is the case if the rating is the only available information on the
issuer or financial product or when the CRA has access to non-public (financial) information.
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